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NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION 
PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that on November 9, 2017, at 1:30 PM, before the Honorable 
Edward M. Chen of the United States District Court for the Northern District of California, 
Courtroom 5, 17th Floor, 450 Golden Gate Avenue, San Francisco, CA 94102, Defendant 
Google Inc. (“Google”) will, and hereby does, move this Court pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 12(b)(6) for an order dismissing the claims against Google asserted by the plaintiffs in 
this action (collectively, “Plaintiffs”) in the Complaint (“Complaint” or “Compl.”) with prejudice 
for failure and inability to state a claim.  
The motion is based upon this Notice of Motion; the Memorandum of Points and 
Authorities in support thereof; the Declaration of Brian Hawkins in support thereof that is filed 
herewith (“Hawkins Decl.”); the Proposed Order filed herewith; the pleadings, records, and 
papers on file in this action; oral argument of counsel; and any other matters properly before the 
Court. 
 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
1. Should the claims against Google be dismissed with prejudice under Fed. R. Civ. 
P. 12(b)(6) because they are precluded by the parties’ agreement, which expressly permits 
Google to take the actions about which Plaintiffs complain? 
2. Should the claims against Google be dismissed with prejudice under Fed. R. Civ. 
P. 12(b)(6) because they are barred by Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act? 
3. Should the claims against Google be dismissed with prejudice under Fed. R. Civ. 
P. 12(b)(6) because Plaintiffs cannot state required elements of their claims? 
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MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Plaintiffs created a series of graphic zombie-killing videos and posted them on YouTube. 
In this lawsuit, Plaintiffs assert that they were injured when YouTube implemented a new video-
rating system that limited the volume of advertisements that could be displayed in connection 
with their videos. Plaintiffs’ claims fail as a matter of law. 
First, the claims are barred by the terms of the parties’ governing agreement. Google 
provides the YouTube service to Plaintiffs free of charge, and Plaintiffs’ ability to have 
advertisements run on their videos is subject to a written contract that expressly provides that 
Google has no obligation to display ads on any given video. Whether on a theory of breach of 
contract or otherwise, Plaintiffs are legally precluded from asserting claims based on conduct 
that is expressly authorized by their binding contract with Google. 
Second, Plaintiffs’ claims are barred by federal law. Section 230 of the Communications 
Decency Act, 47 U.S.C. § 230, immunizes YouTube for actions it takes as a publisher of content 
created by others. Here, Google’s decision to prevent ads from being displayed in connection 
with certain kinds of user-submitted content is a classic example of an editorial judgment that is 
protected by Section 230.  
Third, even beyond the contract and Google’s statutory immunity, Plaintiffs fail to plead 
facts sufficient to support the elements of the claims they have asserted. And any effort to fix 
those pleading deficiencies would be futile.  
For these reasons, Plaintiffs’ Complaint should be dismissed with prejudice. 
 
STATEMENT OF FACTS AND ALLEGATIONS 
A. The YouTube Service and Monetization Program 
Google operates the popular (and free-to-use) YouTube website, where users can upload, 
share, and watch videos. All those who use YouTube must agree to its terms of service (“TOS”). 
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Compl. ¶¶ 12, 36, 96; Hawkins Decl. Ex. 2.
1
 Plaintiffs agreed to the TOS when they created their 
channel on YouTube and uploaded video content to the service. Hawkins Decl. ¶¶ 3, 7. The 
YouTube Terms of Service incorporate the Community Guidelines that caution users against 
uploading certain types of videos, such as “violent or gory content that’s primarily intended to be 
shocking, sensational, or disrespectful,” or “videos that encourage others to do things that might 
cause them to get badly hurt, especially kids.” Hawkins Decl. Ex. 3. These guidelines caution 
that “[v]ideos showing such harmful or dangerous acts may get age-restricted or removed 
depending on their severity.” Id. 
Users who upload videos to YouTube can also opt to participate in a program that allows 
them to receive a share of revenue generated from third-party advertisements that are displayed 
in or alongside a user’s videos. Compl. ¶ 2. To participate in this monetization program, users 
must agree to additional terms and conditions. For most users, including Plaintiffs, these 
additional terms are called the YouTube Partner Program Terms. The YouTube Partner Program 
Terms specifically provide that YouTube has no obligation to display advertisements at all:  
YouTube is not obligated to display any advertisements alongside your videos 
and may determine the type and format of ads available on the YouTube Service. 
Hawkins Decl. Ex. 1 (emphasis added). The Partner Program Terms also expressly incorporate 
and reaffirm the applicability of the TOS and the YouTube Partner Program Policies. Id. 
B. Plaintiffs’ “Zombie Go Boom” YouTube Channel 
Plaintiffs allege that they are the creators of videos uploaded to a YouTube channel they 
call “Zombie Go Boom,” located at www.youtube.com/user/ZombieGoBoomTV. Compl. ¶ 14. 
As reflected by the videos posted to this channel, Zombie Go Boom is a quasi-reality show that 
depicts Plaintiffs attempting to “kill” zombies using various weapons and other objects.2 As one 
                                                 
1
 The Court may properly consider the documents attached to the Declaration of Brian 
Hawkins, which comprise the contract terms that govern the parties’ relationship, because these 
documents are referenced in and relied upon by the Complaint. See infra Section I (citing Swartz 
v. KPMG LLP, 476 F.3d 756, 763 (9th Cir. 2007)); Compl. ¶¶ 12, 36, 96. 
2
 Plaintiffs have made recent changes to the Zombie Go Boom channel in an apparent 
attempt to make the channel seem less objectionable to advertisers. For example, the original 
video description that accompanied each video has been deleted and replaced with “Advertiser 
(continued...) 
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reviewing journalist has described it, “Sweet and Meré’s hub, on which they test all sorts of 
weapons on dummies modeled to look like the undead, is unabashedly bloody and violent.”3 
Indeed, the Zombie Go Boom channel includes videos teaching viewers how to kill zombie 
versions of U.S. presidential candidates with blunt force trauma,
4
 as well as videos depicting real 
life small children killing zombies with associated violence, blood, and gore.
5
 
C. The Alleged Reduction in Ad Revenue from Plaintiffs’ Videos 
Plaintiffs allege that early in 2017, “YouTube began receiving negative press” that 
criticized YouTube for allowing advertisements on user-generated videos that contained 
“objectionable content.” Compl. ¶ 4. Plaintiffs further allege that Google’s third-party 
advertising partners objected to the display of their ads on mature-themed videos and threatened 
to stop advertising on YouTube unless Google found a way to ensure their ads were not run on 
videos with such objectionable content. Compl. ¶¶ 4, 75. In order “to prevent advertising 
partners from leaving YouTube,” Plaintiffs allege that Google “created a program with a 
proprietary algorithm” that “placed a rating on each video” so that “[a]dvertisers could then use 
this rating system to screen certain ratings of videos from the types of videos on which they 
desired their advertisements to be placed, or not placed.” Compl. ¶¶ 75-76. 
Plaintiffs allege that after this new rating system was implemented, advertisers pulled 
their ads from many of Plaintiffs’ videos, resulting in a significant drop in the revenue Plaintiffs 
                                                 
(...continued from previous page) 
friendly, work safe, teen safe!” Compare, e.g., original video description for video located at 
https://web.archive.org/web/20160329192257/https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mquKEyACI
2Q (“Can a brick, brass knuckles, or a golf club kill Donald Trump if he ever became a zombie? 
Only one way to find out.”), with revised description now shown at 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mquKEyACI2Q (“Advertiser friendly, work safe, teen 
safe!”).  
3
 Sam Gutelle, Creators Who Lost Revenue During “Adpocalypse” Seek Class Action 
Lawsuit Against YouTube, Tubefilter, July 17, 2017, 
http://www.tubefilter.com/2017/07/17/zombie-go-boom-youtube-adpocalypse-lawsuit/. 
4
See Hillary Clinton Zombie Kill!, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xnsy03m-sSs; Hillary 
Clinton Zombie Kill 2!, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=DTnPl8Mwzic; Donald Trump 
Zombie Kill Part 1!, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mquKEyACI2Q. 
5
 See Can a 10 year old kill a ZOMBIE?, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=g8fX9lsm91U. 
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were earning from their YouTube videos. Compl. ¶ 29. Plaintiffs warn that “if this 
demonetization of Plaintiffs’ content continues, Plaintiffs will have to shut down the 
Zombiegoboom Channel and find other work.” Compl. ¶ 39. 
Based on these allegations, Plaintiffs assert the following claims against Google on 
behalf of themselves, as well as a putative class of other YouTube users whose videos have 
appeared on YouTube since March 1, 2017: (1) breach of contract; (2) breach of quasi contract; 
(3) breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing; (4) tortious interference with 
contractual relations and/or prospective economic advantage; and (5) violation of the unlawful, 
unfair, and fraudulent prongs of California Business and Professions Code § 17200. Plaintiffs 
seek an injunction requiring Google to publicly disclose the specifics of its proprietary rating 
system, as well as monetary damages, restitution, treble damages, punitive damages, and 
attorneys’ fees. Compl. ¶¶ 49-50, Prayer for Relief. 
 
ARGUMENT 
I. LEGAL STANDARD 
A complaint should be dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6) when it “fail[s] to state a claim 
upon which relief can be granted.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). “[O]nly a complaint that states a 
plausible claim for relief survives a motion to dismiss.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 
(2009) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556 (2007)). “Factual allegations must 
be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. 
“Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory 
statements, do not suffice.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Accordingly, while the Court accepts as true 
all material allegations in the complaint, it need not accept the truth of conclusory allegations or 
unwarranted inferences, nor should it accept legal conclusions as true merely because they are 
cast in the form of factual allegations. Id. at 678-79; accord Epstein v. Wash. Energy Co., 83 
F.3d 1136, 1140 (9th Cir. 1996) (“[C]onclusory allegations of law and unwarranted inferences 
are insufficient to defeat a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim.”).  
Case 3:17-cv-03953-EMC   Document 18   Filed 09/25/17   Page 13 of 31
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
 
 
 
GOOGLE’S MOT. TO DISMISS 
CASE NO. 3:17-CV-03953-EMC 
-5-  
 
Further, the Court should not “accept as true allegations that contradict matters properly 
subject to judicial notice or by exhibit.” Sprewell v. Golden State Warriors, 266 F.3d 979, 988 
(9th Cir. 2001). “[I]n order to prevent plaintiffs from surviving a Rule 12(b)(6) motion by 
deliberately omitting documents upon which their claims are based, a court may consider a 
writing referenced in a complaint but not explicitly incorporated therein if the complaint relies on 
the document and its authenticity is unquestioned.” Swartz v. KPMG LLP, 476 F.3d 756, 763 
(9th Cir. 2007); see also Wietschner v. Monterey Pasta Co., 294 F. Supp. 2d 1102, 1110 (N.D. 
Cal. 2003) (“Where a plaintiff fails to attach to the complaint documents referred to in it, and 
upon which the complaint is premised, a defendant may attach to the motion to dismiss such 
documents in order to show that they do not support plaintiff’s claim.”). 
II. PLAINTIFFS’ CLAIMS FAIL BECAUSE THE PARTIES’ CONTRACT 
DISCLAIMS ANY OBLIGATION BY GOOGLE TO DISPLAY ADS. 
Because Plaintiffs’ claims are all premised on injuries allegedly suffered when YouTube 
ceased displaying ads on Plaintiffs’ videos, these claims are precluded by the express terms of 
the parties’ written contract. That agreement—the YouTube Partner Program Terms—could 
hardly be clearer that YouTube has no obligation to display ads in connection with Plaintiffs’ 
videos: “YouTube is not obligated to display any advertisements alongside your videos and may 
determine the type and format of ads available on the YouTube Service.” Hawkins Decl. Ex. 1. 
When Plaintiffs entered into this agreement, therefore, they expressly agreed that YouTube 
would be under no obligation to show ads on any of their videos and could thus determine when 
it was appropriate to allow such ads to be displayed. This contractual understanding bars the 
claims that Plaintiffs now seek to assert against Google.  
It is a bedrock principle of California law
6
 that no cause of action will lie where it is 
based on otherwise lawful conduct expressly permitted by a governing contract. See, e.g., Smith 
v. Facebook, Inc., No. 16-01282 EJD, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 145031, at *24 (N.D. Cal. May 9, 
                                                 
6
 Plaintiffs’ claims are all asserted under California law, as required by the operative 
agreement. Compl. ¶ 12 (acknowledging California choice of law in the TOS). 
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2017) (contract and tort claims were barred where based on conduct expressly allowed by 
Facebook’s Terms of Use (citing Cal. Civ. Code § 3515 (“He who consents to an act is not 
wronged by it.”))). That is the situation here: Plaintiffs cannot assert claims premised on an 
alleged obligation for Google to display advertisements on their videos, when Plaintiffs 
expressly disavowed any such obligation by entering into the Partner Program Terms. 
In analogous circumstances, courts have consistently rejected the same causes of action 
Plaintiffs assert here where those claims are based on conduct authorized by the parties’ 
agreement: 
 Breach of contract. It is black-letter law that conduct expressly authorized by a 
contract cannot give rise to a claim for breach of that agreement. Carma Developers 
(Cal.), Inc. v. Marathon Dev. Cal., Inc., 2 Cal. 4th 342 (1992); see also, e.g., Song Fi 
Inc. v. Google, Inc., 108 F. Supp. 3d 876, 884-85 (N.D. Cal. 2015) (dismissing 
complaint regarding relocation of plaintiffs’ video because YouTube’s Terms of 
Service “authorize it to relocate or remove videos in its sole discretion”); Woods v. 
Google, Inc., 889 F. Supp. 2d 1182, 1194 (N.D. Cal. 2012) (dismissing breach of 
contract claim over misplaced ads because “the Agreement expressly disavows any 
guarantees regarding ad placement”). 
 Breach of the implied covenant of good faith. Likewise, the California Supreme 
Court has squarely held that “[a]s to acts and conduct authorized by the express 
provisions of the contract, no covenant of good faith and fair dealing can be implied 
which forbids such acts and conduct.” Carma Developers, 2 Cal. 4th at 374; see also, 
e.g., Wolf v. Walt Disney Pictures & Television, 162 Cal. App. 4th 1107, 1121 n.7 
(2008) (rejecting claim for breach of implied covenant where agreement provided that 
defendant “shall not be under any obligation to exercise any of the rights granted to 
Purchaser” (emphasis added)); Smith, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 145031, at *27 (claim 
for breach of the implied covenant barred by express terms of Facebook Terms of 
Use); Song Fi, 108 F. Supp. 3d at 884-85 (dismissing implied covenant claim because 
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“conduct authorized by a contract cannot give rise to a claim for breach of the 
agreement”). 
 Quasi-contract. Courts have repeatedly rejected quasi-contract claims where the 
conduct at issue was expressly permitted by the parties’ agreement. Smith, 2017 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 145031, at *27 (Facebook users could not assert breach of quasi-contract 
claim based on Facebook’s allegedly unlawful tracking of their Internet browsing 
activities where the Facebook user agreement expressly permitted this conduct); 
O’Connor v. Uber Techs., Inc., 58 F. Supp. 3d 989, 1001 (N.D. Cal. 2014) (Uber 
drivers could not assert breach of quasi-contract claim based on ads that suggested 
Uber would remit gratuities to drivers where a written agreement expressly 
disclaimed any obligations arising from Uber ads). Moreover, “it is well settled that 
an action based on an implied-in-fact or quasi-contract cannot lie where there exists 
between the parties a valid express contract covering the same subject matter.” Lance 
Camper Mfg. Corp. v. Republic Indem. Co., 44 Cal. App. 4th 194, 203 (1996); accord 
Klein v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 202 Cal. App. 4th 1342, 1388 (2012) (same); 
O’Connor, 58 F. Supp. 3d at 1000-01 (same). 
 Tortious Interference. Tortious interference claims likewise cannot be premised on 
conduct permitted by a contract. Catanzarite v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., No. E053136, 
2012 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 4432, at *13 (Cal. Ct. App. June 13, 2012) (“Wells 
Fargo’s refusal to agree to do something it was not required to do and was 
contractually permitted to refuse, defeats plaintiffs’ claim of intentional interference 
with contract, as a matter of law.”).7 
                                                 
7
 “[T]his Court may consider an unpublished decision of the California Court of Appeals for 
its ‘persuasive reasoning,’ though it is not decisional law.” Lee v. Pep Boys Manny Moe & Jack 
of Cal., No. 12-05064 JSC, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5432, at *14-16 n.6 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 14, 2014) 
(citing Cole v. Doe 1 thru 2 Officers of City of Emeryville Police Dep’t, 387 F. Supp. 2d 1084, 
1103 n.7 (N.D. Cal. 2005); Jerry Beeman & Pharmacy Servs., Inc. v. Anthem Prescription 
Mgmt., LLC, 652 F.3d 1085, 1093 (9th Cir. 2011) (“[W]e are not precluded from considering 
these unpublished decisions as a possible reflection of California law, although they have no 
precedential value.”)). 
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 Unfair Competition Law. UCL claims are impermissible where they contradict the 
terms of the parties’ agreement because “the UCL cannot be used to rewrite [plaintiffs’] 
contracts or to determine whether the terms of their contracts are fair.” Spiegler v. Home 
Depot U.S.A., Inc., 552 F. Supp. 2d 1036, 1046 (C.D. Cal. 2008), aff’d, 349 F. App’x 174 
(9th Cir. 2009); see also, e.g., Janda v. T-Mobile, USA, Inc., No. 05-03729 JSW, 2009 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24395, at *26-28 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 13, 2009) (dismissing UCL fraud 
claim where defendant made unambiguous disclosures in service agreements), aff’d, 378 
F. App’x 705 (9th Cir. 2010); Yang v. Sun Tr. Mortg., Inc., No. 10-01541, 2011 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 97606, at *16-24 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 31, 2011) (no claim under the UCL could stand 
where parties’ agreement expressly allowed for the actions taken by defendant).  
These principles bar Plaintiffs’ claims in this case. Because each of Plaintiffs’ causes of 
action seek to impose obligations expressly disclaimed by the governing agreement, the 
Complaint must be dismissed in its entirety.  
III. PLAINTIFFS’ CLAIMS ARE BARRED BY SECTION 230 OF THE CDA.  
This action should also be dismissed because any effort to hold Google liable for 
exercising its editorial discretion regarding when third-party advertising appears in connection 
with Plaintiffs’ videos is barred by Section 230(c) of the CDA, 47 U.S.C. § 230(c).  
Section 230 protects website operators from liability for editorial decisions they make 
concerning material posted on their services. See Batzel v. Smith, 333 F.3d 1018, 1027-28 (9th 
Cir. 2003) (explaining that the CDA was enacted, in part, “to encourage interactive computer 
services and users of such services to self-police the Internet for obscenity and other offensive 
material”). As the Ninth Circuit has explained: “any activity that can be boiled down to deciding 
whether to exclude material that third parties seek to post online is perforce immune under 
section 230.” Fair Hous. Council of San Fernando Valley v. Roommates.com, LLC, 521 F.3d 
1157, 1170-71 (9th Cir. 2008) (en banc).  
Indeed, the CDA “shields from liability all publication decisions, whether to edit, to 
remove, or to post, with respect to content generated entirely by third parties.” Barnes v. Yahoo!, 
Inc., 570 F.3d 1096, 1105 (9th Cir. 2009); see also Sikhs for Justice “SFJ”, Inc. v. Facebook Inc., 
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144 F. Supp. 3d 1088, 1093-96 (N.D. Cal. 2015), (applying Section 230(c)(1) to dismiss claims 
against Facebook for removing user’s page), aff’d, 2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 17886 (9th Cir. Sept. 
13, 2017). These provisions provide a “robust immunity.” Holomaxx Techs. Corp. v. Microsoft 
Corp., No. 10-04924 JF, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 94316, at *6 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 23, 2011). 
Accordingly, “lawsuits seeking to hold a service provider liable for its exercise of a publisher’s 
traditional editorial functions—such as deciding whether to publish, withdraw, postpone or alter 
content—are barred.” Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 330 (4th Cir. 1997); see also 
Batzel, 333 F.3d at 1031 n.18 (same).
8
  
The CDA bars Plaintiff’s claims in this case. There can be no dispute that Google’s 
YouTube service is an “interactive computer service.” See 47 U.S.C. § 230(f)(2) (defining 
“interactive computer service” as “any information service, system, or access software provider 
that provides or enables computer access by multiple users to a computer server”). 9  And 
Google’s decisions concerning third party advertising—whether to allow it, remove it, or to limit 
the circumstances in which it is permitted to appear—are clear examples of the kind of “editorial 
and self-regulatory functions” that section 230(c)(1) protects. Ben Ezra, Weinstein, & Co. v. Am. 
Online Inc., 206 F.3d 980, 986 (10th Cir. 2000); see also Goddard v. Google, Inc., 640 F. Supp. 
2d 1193, 1201-02 (N.D. Cal. 2009) (Google’s policies regarding publication of third-party ads 
were a publisher function covered by Section 230(c)(1)); Klayman, 753 F.3d at 1359 (“the very 
essence of publishing is making the decision whether to print or retract a given piece of 
                                                 
8
 CDA immunity should be resolved “at the earliest possible stage of the case.” Nemet 
Chevrolet, Ltd. v. Consumeraffairs.com, Inc., 591 F.3d 250, 254-55 (4th Cir. 2009) (because 
Section 230(c) provides “an immunity from suit rather than a mere defense to liability,” it is 
“effectively lost if a case is erroneously permitted to go to trial”). Courts thus routinely grant 
immunity on motions to dismiss. See, e.g., Lancaster v. Alphabet Inc., No. 15-05299 HSG, 2016 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 88908, at *8 (N.D. Cal. July 8, 2016); Holomaxx Techs. v. Microsoft Corp., 
783 F. Supp. 2d 1097, 1103 (N.D. Cal. 2011); accord Klayman v. Zuckerberg, 753 F.3d 1354, 
1359 (D.C. Cir. 2014). 
9
 Numerous courts have held that YouTube qualifies as an “interactive computer service.” 
See, e.g., Lancaster, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 88908, at *7; Darnaa, LLC v. Google, Inc., No. 15-
03221 RMW, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 152126, at *20-21 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 2, 2016); Gavra v. 
Google Inc., No. 12-06547 PSG, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 100127, at *4-9 (N.D. Cal. July 17, 
2013) (CDA immunized Google from liability arising from allegedly defamatory videos posted 
to YouTube). 
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content”); Levitt v. Yelp! Inc., No. 10-1321 EMC, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 124082, at *23 (N.D. 
Cal. Oct. 26, 2011) (“editorial decisions such as whether to publish or de-publish a particular 
review” are publisher functions covered by 230(c)(1)’s immunity; dismissing claim that Yelp 
“unlawfully manipulated the content of their business review pages”), aff’d, 765 F.3d 1123 (9th 
Cir. 2014). Indeed, even outside the Section 230 context, courts have long recognized that it is 
the role of a publisher to decide whether and when to place advertisements. See Assocs. & 
Aldrich Co. v. Times Mirror Co., 440 F.2d 133, 136 (9th Cir. 1971) (publisher may decide 
whether to publish advertisements and control their content); Stewart v. Rolling Stone LLC, 181 
Cal. App. 4th 664, 690-91 (2010) (publisher has the right to choose the “content and placement 
of advertisements”). 
A consistent line of decisions from this District have applied Section 230(c)(1) to bar 
claims that seek to impose liability on online services for making similar types of editorial 
decisions. In SFJ, recently affirmed by the Ninth Circuit, Judge Koh held that Facebook’s 
removal of a user’s page from the service was “publisher conduct immunized by the CDA.” 144 
F. Supp. 3d at 1095. The court observed that “removing content is something publishers do, and 
to impose liability on the basis of such conduct necessarily involves treating the liable party as a 
publisher.” Id. (quoting Barnes, 570 F.3d at 1103). Likewise in Lancaster, Judge Gilliam 
specifically held that YouTube was immune under Section 230(c)(1) for removing videos and 
advertising from the plaintiff’s YouTube channel in response to allegedly false complaints from 
third parties. 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 88908, at *8; see also, e.g., Darnaa, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
152126, at *23 (YouTube immune from tort liability under Section 230(c)(1) for removing and 
relocating the plaintiff’s video).  
The same result is warranted in this case. Plaintiffs seek to hold Google liable for its 
determinations regarding which videos are eligible for advertising and under what circumstances 
third-party ads will be displayed on its service. That is a paradigmatic example of a publisher 
decision, just like the determination to publish user-submitted content in the first place, or to 
alter or remove such content. As the Ninth Circuit has explained: “It is because such conduct is 
publishing conduct that we have insisted that section 230 protects from liability ‘any activity that 
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can be boiled down to deciding whether to exclude material that third parties seek to post 
online.’” Barnes, 570 F.3d at 1103 (quoting Roommates, 521 F.3d at 1170-71) (emphasis in 
original); see also, e.g., Ben Ezra, 206 F.3d at 986 (“By deleting the allegedly inaccurate stock 
quotation information, Defendant was simply engaging in the editorial functions Congress 
sought to protect.”). So it is here. When Google decides that certain videos should have limited 
(or no) advertising associated with them, it is acting as a publisher. See Times Mirror, 440 F.2d 
at 136; Stewart, 181 Cal. App. 4th at 690-91. Plaintiff’s effort to attack that editorial judgment is 
squarely barred by section 230(c)(1). See See Lancaster, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 88908, *8 
(“[T]he Court holds that § 230(c)(1) of the CDA precludes as a matter of law any claims arising 
from Defendants’ removal of Plaintiff’s videos and GRANTS the motion to dismiss to the extent 
that Plaintiff seeks to impose liability as a result of said removals.”).10  
For these reasons, Plaintiffs’ claims fail as a matter of law, and the the Complaint should 
be dismissed with prejudice. See Lancaster, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 88908, at *8 (“Any 
amendment would be futile, and thus the Court dismisses such claims with prejudice”); SFJ, 144 
F. Supp. 3d at 1096 (dismissing claims with prejudice because Section 230 “must be interpreted 
to protect websites not merely from ultimate liability, but from having to fight costly and 
protracted legal battles” (quoting Roommates, 521 F.3d at 1175)).  
IV. PLAINTIFFS FAIL TO STATE REQUIRED ELEMENTS OF THEIR CLAIMS.  
Even beyond these categorical defects in the Complaint, Plaintiffs fail to state a legally 
viable claim under any of the causes of action they invoke.  
A. The Breach of Contract Claim Fails. 
In California, a breach of contract claim requires: “(1) the existence of the contract, (2) 
plaintiff’s performance or excuse for nonperformance, (3) defendant’s breach, and (4) the 
                                                 
10
 Section 230(c)(2) of the CDA, 47 U.S.C. 230(c)(2), provides an independent basis for 
dismissal of Plaintiff’s claims, but in light of the numerous other arguments presented in this 
motion, there is no need to address that issue here. Google reserves its rights to invoke that 
immunity, if necessary, at a later stage of the case.  
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resulting damages to the plaintiff.” Oasis W. Realty, LLC v. Goldman, 51 Cal. 4th 811, 821 
(2011). Plaintiffs fail to allege these elements. Compl. ¶¶ 95-100. 
First, as set forth above, a breach of contract claim cannot be premised on conduct that is 
authorized by the contract. Supra Section II. As a matter of law, any decision by Google to limit 
the ads that run in connection with Plaintiffs’ videos could not have breached the parties’ 
contract because that agreement expressly disclaims any obligation on YouTube to display ads. 
Second, Plaintiffs fail to sufficiently plead the existence of any contract terms that were 
actually breached by the conduct at issue. Plaintiffs did not attach the parties’ contracts to their 
complaint, and they do not identify any term of those agreements (by paragraph, section, or 
otherwise) that Google allegedly breached. Consequently, it is impossible to discern the nature of 
the alleged breach, as the complaint includes only vague and conclusory allegations on this point. 
The claim should thus be dismissed. Kent v. Microsoft Corp., No. 13-0091, 2013 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 93932, at *9-10 (C.D. Cal. July 1, 2013) (“since neither the terms of the contract, nor its 
manner of breach, have been asserted with sufficient detail, the Plaintiff has yet to plead a valid 
cause of action for breach of contract”). 
Third, Plaintiffs make a conclusory allegation that they “performed all obligations arising 
from the contract,” but they fail to allege what those obligations were and any facts showing that 
they performed those obligations. Compl. ¶ 98. Indeed, the violent subject matter of Plaintiffs’ 
videos (depicting gory zombie killings) is non-compliant with the YouTube terms that disallow 
“violent or gory content that’s primarily intended to be shocking, sensational, or disrespectful,” 
or “videos that encourage others to do things that might cause them to get badly hurt, especially 
kids.” Hawkins Decl. Ex. 3.  
Finally, Plaintiffs cannot allege contract damages or entitlement to specific performance 
based on the allegedly erroneous removal of ads from their videos. The governing YouTube TOS 
include a specific limitation on liability provision: “IN NO EVENT SHALL YOUTUBE … BE 
LIABLE TO YOU FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, PUNITIVE, 
OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM ANY (I) 
ERRORS, MISTAKES, OR INACCURACIES OF CONTENT … AND/OR (V) ANY ERRORS 
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OR OMISSIONS IN ANY CONTENT ….” Hawkins Decl. Ex. 2 § 10.11 Controlling California 
appellate authority makes clear that this provision bars any claim for contract damages in 
circumstances like this. Lewis v. YouTube, LLC, 244 Cal. App. 4th 118, 125 (2015). In Lewis, the 
plaintiff sued Google for breach of contract after it allegedly deleted her entire YouTube 
channel, including videos and associated view counts. The Court of Appeal held that this 
constituted an “omission” of “content” under the limitation of liability provision, and that the 
provision applied to bar any claim for damages. Id. at 125-26. Accordingly, the Court affirmed 
dismissal of the plaintiff’s breach of contract claim, holding the plaintiff “failed to establish that 
she was entitled to either damages or specific performance” because the contract precluded all 
damages, and plaintiff identified no contractual provisions to be specifically performed. Id. at 
120, 125-27.  
Here, as in Lewis (which controls this case), Plaintiffs assert a breach of contract claim 
based on Google’s allegedly erroneous omission of content (the ads that used to appear next to 
Plaintiffs’ videos). See Compl. ¶ 7 (alleging that ads were erroneously pulled from Plaintiffs’ 
videos because Google’s “algorithms did not work”). Consequently, the limitation of liability in 
the YouTube TOS acts to bar their claims that seek contract damages. 
B. The Breach of the Implied Covenant Claim Fails. 
Plaintiffs’ implied covenant claim fails for many of the same reason as the breach 
contract claim:  
First, as discussed above, see supra Section II, the implied covenant “cannot impose 
substantive duties or limits on the contracting parties beyond those incorporated in the specific 
terms of their agreement.” Guz v. Bechtel Nat’l, Inc., 24 Cal. 4th 317, 349-50 (2000). “The 
                                                 
11
 The need for this limitation of liability is clear in the context of the service Google 
provides. Google offers the YouTube service for free and covers the substantial costs of file 
storage, bandwidth and administration. See, e.g., Markborough Cal., Inc. v. Super. Ct., 227 Cal. 
App. 3d 705, 714 (1991) (“[L]imitation of liability provisions are particularly important where 
the beneficiary of the clause is involved in a ‘high-risk, low-compensation service.’”); Doe v. 
SexSearch.com, 502 F. Supp. 2d 719, 734 (N.D. Ohio 2007) (“[A] limitation on damages clause 
is commercially reasonable to avoid the specter of potential liability which far exceeds the 
meager price paid, if any, for membership.”), aff’d, 551 F.3d 412 (6th Cir. 2008).  
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covenant of good faith is read into contracts in order to protect the express covenants or promises 
of the contract, not to protect some general public policy interest not directly tied to the 
contract’s purposes.” Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., 47 Cal. 3d 654, 690 (1988); see also 
Carma Developers, 2 Cal. 4th at 374. Plaintiffs cannot invoke the implied covenant to assert that 
Google is required to display advertisements on Plaintiffs’ videos (or to display them pursuant to 
particular criteria) when the contract expressly disclaims any obligation to display ads at all. That 
approach impermissibly seeks to rewrite the contract, not enforce it. 
Second, like the express contract claim, Plaintiffs’ implied covenant claim is barred by 
the limitation of liability provision in the TOS. Darnaa LLC v. Google, Inc., 236 F. Supp. 3d 
1116, 1126 (N.D. Cal. 2017) (“Section 10 of the [YouTube] terms of service agreement bars 
claims for breach of the implied covenant under this fact pattern.”). 
Third, Plaintiffs’ implied covenant claim should be dismissed because it is duplicative of 
the breach of contract claim and based on the same alleged conduct. Compare Compl. ¶¶ 96-99, 
with Compl. ¶¶ 103-107; Landucci v. State Farm Ins. Co., 65 F. Supp. 3d 694, 716 (N.D. Cal. 
2014) (“a claim alleging breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing cannot be 
‘based on the same breach as the contract claim,’ or else it will be dismissed”); Careau & Co. v. 
Sec. Pac. Bus. Credit, Inc., 222 Cal. App. 3d 1371, 1395 (1990) (breach of the implied covenant 
claim fails if it does “not go beyond the statement of a mere contract breach”). 
C. The Breach of Quasi-Contract Claim Fails. 
Setting aside the rule that a plaintiff can have no quasi -contract claim where the parties 
have an express contract on the same subject matter (supra Section II), Plaintiffs’ quasi contract 
claim also fails because there is no allegation that Google ever asked Plaintiffs to perform any 
services. To establish a quasi-contract claim “a plaintiff must establish both that he or she was 
acting pursuant to either an express or implied request for such services from the defendant and 
that the services rendered were intended to and did benefit the defendant.” Day v. Alta Bates 
Med. Ctr., 98 Cal. App. 4th 243, 248 (2002) (emphasis in original). A plaintiff “must [also] show 
the circumstances were such that the services were rendered under some understanding or 
expectation of both parties that compensation therefor was to be made.” Huskinson & Brown, 
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LLP v. Wolf, 32 Cal. 4th 453, 458 (2004) (emphasis added). Plaintiffs allege none of that here. 
The Complaint is devoid of any allegation that Google requested that Plaintiffs provide any 
services to YouTube or create the Zombie Go Boom content. Rather, Plaintiffs voluntarily 
created the Zombie Go Boom videos without any request from YouTube, and they allege no 
exclusive arrangement between Plaintiffs and YouTube regarding the posting of those videos to 
YouTube.  
D. The Tortious Interference Claims Fail. 
Plaintiffs next assert two related claims for intentional interference with their contractual 
and/or economic relationships. Both fail.  
As an initial matter, each of these claims requires a plausible allegation that Google had 
knowledge of the contractual or economic relationships between Plaintiffs and particular third 
parties. See Winchester Mystery House, LLC v. Glob. Asylum, Inc., 210 Cal. App. 4th 579, 596 
(2012); accord Restatement (Second) of Torts § 766 cmt. i (“the actor must have knowledge of 
the contract with which he is interfering and of the fact that he is interfering with the 
performance of the contract”). While the defendant need not know every detail of the contract, 
actionable interference requires knowing enough to understand that one’s acts interfere with its 
performance. Little v. Amber Hotel Co., 202 Cal. App. 4th 280, 302 (2011); Winchester Mystery 
House, 210 Cal. App. 4th at 585. Conclusory allegations that the defendant knew of the 
plaintiff’s contract are not sufficient. See, e.g., Yagman v. Galipo, No. 12-7908, 2013 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 120497, at *37 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 15, 2013) (dismissing claim where plaintiff “fails to 
plausibly allege that the other Defendants were even aware of Plaintiff’s hourly fee contract with 
[third party]”); Trindade v. Reach Media Grp., LLC, No. 12-4759 PSG, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
107707, at *52-53 (N.D. Cal. July 31, 2013) (granting motion to dismiss for failure to allege 
knowledge of “any specific contracts or details about the contracts”); Davis v. Nadrich, 174 Cal. 
App. 4th 1, 10-11 (2009) (because defendant did not know that plaintiff still had a “viable 
partnership” agreement, he was not “sufficiently aware of the details” of that contract “to form 
an intent to harm it”). 
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Plaintiffs here do not come close to meeting this requirement. The Complaint identifies 
two types of business relationships that were allegedly disrupted: an offer by an interested buyer 
to purchase all of Plaintiffs’ existing content (¶ 40), and deals to promote other products through 
videos advertising those goods and services (¶ 41). But Plaintiffs offer no plausible allegation 
that Google knew about any of these relationships, much less that it had sufficient information 
about them to have intentionally disrupted them. The only gesture Plaintiffs even try to make in 
the direction of knowledge is the generalized assertion that “YouTube was aware that Plaintiffs 
and Class members routinely enter into such related contracts with third parties.” Compl. ¶ 90. 
Even if such a bare conclusion could be accepted as true, general knowledge that industry 
participants have contracts is not equivalent to knowledge that a plaintiff has specific contract 
terms relevant to alleged interference. See Trindade, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 107707, at *52-53 
(allegations that defendant had “generalized knowledge that [plaintiff] was a party to contracts 
with advertisers” failed to properly allege knowledge of “any specific contracts or details about 
the contracts”); Winchester Mystery House, 210 Cal. App. 4th at 596 (rejecting tortious 
interference claim where defendant did not have enough information about the nature of 
plaintiff’s contract to know that it was interfering). 
Plaintiffs’ failure to plead Google’s knowledge of their third-party relationships also 
results in a failure to plead intent to interfere. This element requires that the defendant at least 
“know[] that the interference is certain or substantially certain to occur as a result of his action.” 
Quelimane Co. v. Stewart Title Guar. Co., 19 Cal. 4th 26, 56 (1998) (quoting Restatement 
(Second) of Torts § 766 cmt. j). Here, “[b]ecause [Plaintiffs] fail[] to sufficiently allege that 
[Google] had anything more than generalized knowledge of any contractual relationships, [they] 
likewise fail[] to allege that [Google] developed the requisite intent to disrupt those 
relationships.” Trindade, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 107707, at *54. Indeed, Plaintiffs’ effort to 
allege intentional interference is even less plausible in light of the Complaint’s allegation that 
Google’s changes in monetization policy were in response to unrelated considerations about 
responding to advertisers’ concerns about ads appearing alongside inappropriate material. 
Compl. ¶¶ 4, 75. 
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Finally, Plaintiffs have not alleged any independently wrongful act, which is a necessary 
element of the claim for interference with prospective economic advantage. “[A]n act is 
independently wrongful if it is unlawful, that is, if it is proscribed by some constitutional, 
statutory, regulatory, common law, or other determinable legal standard.” Korea Supply Co. v. 
Lockheed Martin Corp., 29 Cal. 4th 1134, 1159 (2003). Yet Plaintiffs have failed to allege any 
unlawful act or violation of law by Google. See, e.g., Block v. eBay, Inc., 747 F.3d 1135, 1141 
(9th Cir. 2014) (affirming dismissal of interference claim where no “independently wrongful act” 
was adequately alleged). 
E. The UCL Claims Fail. 
Under Section 17200 of the UCL, a plaintiff may assert claims for conduct that is 
“unlawful,” “unfair,” or “fraudulent.” Plaintiffs’ First and Second Claims for Relief relate to 
these three prongs, but the Complaint fails to make out a claim as to any prong. 
1. Plaintiffs Assert No Viable Claim Under the “Unlawful” Prong. 
 
 “Unlawful” conduct under the UCL refers to independently unlawful acts, and courts 
dismiss causes of action where the plaintiff fails to allege factual support for each element of an 
independently unlawful act upon which the unfair competition claim rests. See Sencion v. Saxon 
Mortg. Servs., Inc., No. 10-3108 PSG, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8567, at *15-16 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 
28, 2011). If the plaintiff fails to state the underlying claim, the dependent UCL “unlawful” 
claim fails as well. See Oracle Am., Inc. v. CedarCrestone, Inc., 938 F. Supp. 2d 895, 908 (N.D. 
Cal. 2013) (section 17200 claim failed because underlying antitrust claim dismissed).  
Plaintiffs cannot sustain their “unlawful” UCL claim because they have not alleged any 
qualifying unlawful act. They first attempt to condition the UCL claim on a “violat[ion] of 
California Contract Law principles,” Compl. ¶ 62, but breach of contract is foreclosed under the 
law from serving as the underlying wrong. Shroyer v. New Cingular Wireless Servs., Inc., 606 F. 
3d 658, 666 (9th Cir. 2010); Singh v. Google Inc., No. 16-03734 BLF, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
85196, at *11 (N.D. Cal. June 2, 2017) (breach of implied covenant cannot serve as underlying 
wrong). Plaintiffs also seek to draw in common law fraud and tortious interference. Compl. ¶ 62. 
For the same reasons that those claims fail on a stand-alone basis (with common law fraud 
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failing for the same reason as the UCL fraud claim, as discussed below), the UCL claim under 
the “unlawful” prong fails as well. 
2. Plaintiffs Assert No Viable Claim Under The “Unfair” Prong. 
 
For claims of “unfair” conduct, UCL claims brought by a business like Plaintiffs’ require 
facts showing “actual or threatened impact on competition.” Cel-Tech Commc’ns, Inc. v. Los 
Angeles Cellular Tel. Co., 20 Cal. 4th 163, 186-87 (1999); Levitt v. Yelp! Inc., 765 F.3d 1123, 
1137 (9th Cir. 2014) (plaintiffs in business-to-business cases must satisfy “Cel-Tech’s 
requirement that the effect of [defendant’s] conduct amounts to a violation of antitrust laws ‘or 
otherwise significantly threatens or harms competition’”).12  
Under this standard, individualized injury suffered by a lone plaintiff is not enough. Cel-
Tech, 20 Cal. 4th at 186 (“[i]njury to a competitor is not equivalent to injury to competition”); 
Marsh v. Anesthesia Servs. Med. Grp., Inc., 200 Cal. App. 4th 480, 501 (2011) (“individualized 
harm … does not support a claim for violation of the UCL”); see also Tuck Beckstoffer Wines 
LLC v. Ultimate Distribs., Inc., 682 F. Supp. 2d 1003, 1019 (N.D. Cal. 2010) (plaintiff “must 
establish harm to competition, not merely harm to itself”); Girafa.com, Inc. v. Alexa Internet, 
Inc., No. 08-02745 RMW, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 78260, at *5, *9 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 6, 2008) 
(same); Silicon Image, Inc. v. Analogix Semiconductor, Inc., No. 07-0635 JCS, 2007 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 39599, at *19 (N.D. Cal. May 16, 2007) (same).  
In determining whether actual harm to competition has been alleged, there is no “relevant 
distinction in the standards” between an antitrust claim and a UCL claim. Apple Inc. v. Psystar 
Corp., 586 F. Supp. 2d 1190, 1204 (N.D. Cal. 2008). Hence, even in cases where the plaintiff 
can show some conceivable harm to competition, the challenged conduct does not violate the 
                                                 
12
 Because this is a business and not a consumer case, the alternative “balancing” test for 
unfairness that is sometimes used in consumer cases does not apply. But even if it did, Plaintiffs 
have failed to allege facts showing that Google’s conduct in attempting to avoid monetization of 
extreme or offensive content is “immoral, unethical, oppressive, unscrupulous or substantially 
injurious to consumers.” Bardin v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 136 Cal. App. 4th 1255, 1260 (2006). 
Nor have they pleaded facts showing that the “the utility of [Google’s] conduct” is outweighed 
by “the harm to the alleged victim.” S. Bay Chevrolet v. Gen. Motors Acceptance Corp., 72 Cal. 
App. 4th 861, 886 (1999).  
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UCL if it does not meet the test for harm to competition under antitrust jurisprudence. See, e.g., 
Sybersound Records, Inc. v. UAV Corp., 517 F.3d 1137, 1140, 1153 (9th Cir. 2008) (no UCL 
violation where plaintiff’s competitor lied to customers that its karaoke records were 100 percent 
licensed because such conduct was not “an incipient violation of antitrust law”); Chavez v. 
Whirlpool Corp., 93 Cal. App. 4th 363, 375 (2001) (alleged resale price maintenance scheme 
was not “unfair” where such conduct was “not an unreasonable restraint of trade” under antitrust 
jurisprudence); RLH Indus., Inc. v. SBC Commc’ns, Inc., 133 Cal. App. 4th 1277, 1286-87 
(2005) (no UCL violation despite exclusion of competitor where competition remained in the 
market among other competitors). 
Here, Plaintiffs’ “unfairness” claim is based entirely on the premise that they have 
suffered a loss of revenue that makes it more difficult for them to compete in the “market for 
content providers.” Compl. ¶ 29 (describing Plaintiffs’ alleged loss of revenue following 
Google’s advertising policy change), ¶ 63 (alleging an undefined “market for content 
providers”). Yet this individualized competitor injury is not cognizable under California’s unfair 
competition law, as illustrated by the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Levitt v. Yelp. 765 F.3d at 1136-
37. There, business owners sued Yelp based on its advertising practices: “the crux of the 
business owners’ complaint is that Yelp’s conduct unfairly injures their economic interests to the 
benefit of other businesses who choose to advertise with Yelp.” Id. at 1136. The business owners 
sought to invoke the unfair prong of the UCL by alleging generally that Yelp’s conduct “harms 
competition by favoring businesses that submit to Yelp’s manipulative conduct … to the 
detriment of competing businesses that decline to purchase advertising.” Id. The Ninth Circuit 
affirmed the dismissal of the unfair competition claim, finding that the individualized harm 
alleged by the business owners did not amount to a violation of antitrust laws or threaten or harm 
competition. Id. at 1137. Plaintiffs’ complaint here—that they suffered harm and have been 
treated differently than competitor content providers—should be dismissed for the same reason. 
3. Plaintiffs Assert No Viable Claim Under The “Fraudulent” Prong. 
 
To state a claim under the UCL’s fraud prong, “Plaintiffs must allege specific facts to 
show that the members of the public are likely to be deceived” by a specific misrepresentation. 
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In re Google Inc. Privacy Policy Litig., No. 12-01382 PSG, 2013 U.S Dist. LEXIS 171124, at 
*44-45 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 3, 2013); accord In re iPhone 4S Consumer Litig., 637 F. App’x 415, 
415-16 (9th Cir. 2016). “[T]o be actionable under the UCL, a concealed fact must be material in 
the sense that it is likely to deceive a reasonable consumer.” Clemens v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 
534 F.3d 1017, 1025-26 (9th Cir. 2008) (citing Aron v. U-Haul Co. of Cal., 143 Cal. App. 4th 
796, 806 (2006)). In addition, the “[p]laintiff must show that he personally lost money or 
property because of his own actual and reasonable reliance on the allegedly untrue or 
misleading statements.” Rosado v. eBay, Inc., 53 F. Supp. 3d 1256, 1264-65 (N.D. Cal. 2014) 
(emphasis added). 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b) applies to UCL claims based on allegedly fraudulent 
practices. Kearns v. Ford Motor Co., 567 F.3d 1120, 1124-25 (9th Cir. 2009). Under this 
standard, a plaintiff must include particularized allegations identifying the alleged statements and 
showing how they were fraudulent. Oestreicher v. Alienware Corp., 544 F. Supp. 2d 964, 968 
(N.D. Cal. 2008) (“[P]laintiffs seeking to satisfy Rule 9(b) must ‘set forth an explanation as to 
why the statement or omission complained of was false and misleading.’”), aff’d, 322 F. App’x 
489 (9th Cir. 2009). The allegations must contain “‘the who, what, when, where, and how’ of the 
misconduct charged.” Vess v. Ciba-Geigy Corp. USA, 317 F.3d 1097, 1106 (9th Cir. 2003).  
Plaintiffs’ fraud claim here fails on each of these bases. As an initial matter, it is unclear 
what the basis is for this claim. Plaintiffs do not identify any specific statement by Google that 
was supposedly false or misleading, much less provide any of the detail required by Rule 9(b), 
such as the “time, place, and specific content of the false representations as well as the identities 
of the parties to the misrepresentations.” Swartz, 476 F.3d at 764. Plaintiffs assert only that they 
allegedly relied on “the fact that historically they could expect a certain return on investment to 
the content they created.” Compl. ¶ 74. This falls far short of alleging a specific false statement 
by Google that could conceivably have created such an expectation.  
Even if Plaintiffs could somehow identify a misleading statement, their claim still would 
fail for lack of reasonable reliance. As a matter of law, Plaintiffs could not have reasonably relied 
on a (hypothetical) representation by Google that advertising on Plaintiffs’ videos would 
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continue in the same manner indefinitely. That is because, as discussed, the express provisions of 
the governing Partner Program Terms made clear to Plaintiffs that Google had no obligation to 
display any advertisements at all in connection with their videos. It is well settled that such clear 
language in a governing agreement setting forth the terms of the parties’ relationship precludes a 
contracting party from claiming that it reasonably relied on an extra-contractual statement 
suggesting something different. See, e.g., Block, 747 F.3d at 1140 (affirming dismissal of UCL 
claim because defendant’s disclosures required conclusion that plaintiff “could not have relied on 
the alleged misrepresentations, nor would they have been material”); Janda, 2009 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 24395, at *26-28 (dismissing UCL fraud claim where defendant made unambiguous 
disclosures in service agreements); Spiegler, 552 F. Supp. 2d at 1047-48 (dismissing UCL fraud 
claim in light of an unambiguous contract).  
Finally, to the extent Plaintiffs suggest that their claim may be based on a theory of 
fraudulent omission, they do not come close to alleging what is required. “In general, ‘California 
courts have ... rejected a broad obligation to disclose,’” and an omission claim is permissible 
only where the defendant had an affirmative legal duty to disclose the information at issue. Sud 
v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 229 F. Supp. 3d 1075, 1085 (N.D. Cal. 2017) (quoting Wilson v. 
Hewlett-Packard Co., 668 F.3d 1136, 1141 (9th Cir. 2012)). Google was under no such duty 
here, because, again, Google had already expressly disclosed that it “is not obligated to display 
any advertisements alongside [Plaintiffs’] videos.” Hawkins Decl. Ex. 1. Plaintiffs’ Complaint 
includes only a conclusory assertion that “YouTube had a duty to clearly and conspicuously 
disclose to Plaintiffs and Class members all of the material terms of its monetization structure, 
and the algorithms by which AdSense was selecting content to be monetized or demonetized.” 
Compl. ¶ 83. Plaintiffs allege no facts establishing the source of such an alleged duty to disclose. 
Beyond that, Plaintiffs cannot allege that any such alleged omission regarding Google’s criteria 
for making ad placement decisions was material, given that Plaintiffs agreed in the Partner 
Program Terms that Google had no obligation to display ads at all. 
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CONCLUSION 
For these reasons, Google respectfully requests that the Court dismiss the Complaint. The 
dismissal should be with prejudice, as any amendment would be futile in light of the clear terms 
of the parties’ agreements and the protections provided to Google by Section 230 of the CDA. 
See, e.g., Lancaster, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 88908, at *8 (dismissing claims with prejudice 
following conclusion that “the CDA precludes as a matter of law” the defendant’s claims); Black 
v. Google Inc., No. 10-02381 CW, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 82905, at *9 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 13, 
2010) (“Plaintiffs’ action is dismissed with prejudice as barred by 47 U.S.C. § 230.”), aff’d, 457 
F. App’x 622 (9th Cir. 2011); Song Fi, 108 F. Supp. 3d at 885 (dismissing claims with prejudice 
upon finding that because “YouTube’s Terms of Service unambiguously foreclose these claims, 
granting leave to amend would be futile”). 
Dated: September 25, 2017   WILSON SONSINI GOODRICH & ROSATI 
Professional Corporation 
 
By: /s/ Maura L. Rees   
Maura L. Rees 
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